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Radical embodiment and morphological computation: 
Against the autonomy of (some) special sciences

I.	Natural kinds, connectionist architectures and the autonomy of psychology
Cognitive systems are thought to constitute a natural kind. The result is the non-reductive pairing of psychological laws with sets of underlying physical mechanisms (Fodor, 1974). The reasons for this do not depend upon favouring a Fodorian architecture of cognition. Even granting an eliminative connectionist architecture of the sort challenged by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), we may discover, courtesy of statistical techniques such as cluster analysis, that different networks define a unique class by dividing their respective hidden spaces into significantly similar sub-spaces. So long as the relevant information is somehow implicit in whatever sensor-input schemes happen to be employed, and so long as the training procedures impose the same requirements on performance, then diverse networks can settle into almost identical abstract organizations. Research by Laakso and Cottrell (2000) shows how different partitions of hidden space across networks can still reveal a common strategy despite a degree of functional divergence inherent to connectionist processing.​[1]​ We may then assign genuine kinds to different networks regardless of their architectural idiosyncrasies. Cognitive systems, in short, may well form a natural kind, and the special character of psychology as an autonomous science may thus be vindicated.​[2]​
The friend of reductionism may nevertheless wish to argue that neural networks still fail to constitute a natural kind. The issue boils down, the argument would run, to the question of whether clusters are causally efficacious in the production of the network’s patterns of input/output behaviour. What gets activated, at each step of processing, is a component of the cluster, not the cluster itself. Uniting some of these hidden states should not drive us to think that the network actually employs the sort of entities that psychology posits. In short, post hoc statistical techniques of the sort deployed in the neuromodeler’s methodology are causally inert, thus failing to play any explanatory role as far as the dynamics of connectionist networks is taken as our model of cognition.
The issue, unfortunately for the reductionist, is not that easy to untangle. Clark (1995) argues that denying the causal efficacy of psychological posits may place us in a dangerous position of microphysical worship: “Unless the sceptic is willing to give up the causal efficacy of chemical properties too, he or she would be unwise to object to the very idea of higher-level constructs figuring in genuine causal claims” (p. 350). It is not clear to me, however, that the choice is twofold. Is it really the case that either we accept all higher-level causal claims as genuine, or we reject them altogether, becoming thus ‘microphycical worshippers’? We may after all be able to move the burden of causation safely from a micro to a macro-level in certain cases (say, biology or chemistry), and not in others (say, psychology or economics), avoiding falling into microphysical worship. 
But we may not even need to dwell on these issues. The explanatory role allegedly played by folk psychology’s posits in revealing the coarse-grained nature of cognition, the rebuttal would go, does not need to be subject to the condition of causal efficacy. All that is required is a notion of causal explanation dissociated from the requirement of causal efficacy. Following Jackson and Pettit (1988), extended functionalists (see below), such as Andy Clark, have exploited the distinction between program and process explanations. A program explanation is any high-level explanation that, while gathering a range of cases in terms of certain macrofeatures being shared, abstracts away from the actual microfeatures which carry the burden of causation. Following that type of explanation, those common macrofeatures are said to ‘causally program’ a given pattern of behaviour, without actually being part of the causal explanation of that behaviour. By contrast, an example of a process explanation is an explanation that picks out the microfeatures that are causally efficacious. We may then say that cluster analysis causally programs the network’s performance, although it does not play any role as part of the process explanation of the behaviour of the network. 
The sympathiser of reductionism may rebut once again, and the Fodorian will surely counter in her turn. Unfortunately, the threat that the game is brought to a deadlock now looms in the horizon. In what follows, I shall try therefore to tie-break against the anti-reductionist by casting a different light upon this set of issues.

II.	Generalization in connectionist networks
Instead of relating connectionist clusters and the issue of their causal efficacy to the putative status of cognitive systems as natural kinds, we may hook up talk of clusters to the capacity of a connectionist network to generalize. Shea (2007) considers what sort of entity can be the vehicle of content in a neural network. His answer is that unless clusters are the vehicles of content, we will not be able to explain generalizations. He claims, “By activating a cluster the network represents that the new sample has the property common to the training samples in the cluster. This correct intermediate classification is part of the process by which the network makes a correct output classification.” (p. 255).
In my view, the typing of clusters as the vehicles of content fails to explain how neural networks do actually generalize. In fact, Shea’s account amounts to a Fodorian only-game-in-town sort of move: How would a network be able to generalize after all if it is not by means of exploiting something projectible that is being shared, some common property, between novel and training exemplars? But notice that there is no positive evidence that some shared property is realistically projected. We merely exploit as an inference to the best explanation that something must have been shared, if we are to grasp how a network can extend its competency beyond the training regime. However, if Shea’s claim that “the new sample has the property common to the training samples in the cluster” implies that we accept the thesis that the predicates of the special sciences are projectible (cf. Gillett, 2007), an argument is needed in order to show why that is the case. Unfortunately, all we have is an only-game-in-town negative claim.
So, what do we really mean when we claim that a neural network is able to generalize? In my view, rather than the activation of a cluster, the critical element in explaining generalization capabilities is the learning algorithm itself. The ability to generalize is a function of the similarity between the function acquired during training and the function that underlies the test set. But for the learning algorithm to furnish the network with the appropriate connection weight adjustments, the global functional profile is irrelevant. Note that all that matters is locally accessible to each single unit during the process of weight adjustment. 




III.	Disembodied computations and algorithms
Cognitive scientists usually first provide a computational level description of the cognitive capacity they try to account for. Only later, once the target has been fully characterized in computational terms, they ask how it is carried out algorithmically. Put bluntly, the problem is that, in doing so, the computational profile is carried along the way as a constraint on our discussion at the next lower algorithmic level. Whereas discussion focuses upon the deployment of algebraic or statistical resources (see for example, Marcus, 2001), the computational level of description remains unaltered throughout the whole process (for example, the description of the ability to output the past tense of English verbs). Algorithmic level manipulations on internal representations are said to be appropriate insofar as the cognitive level description of the capacity to be accounted for is matched. And cluster analysis is thought to allow us to gauge whether the algorithmic level matches the requirements stated at the computational level. 
This asymmetry between the demands at the computational and algorithmic levels furnishes the anti-reductionist illusion that something fixed, namely, the abstract profile at the computational level, can be multiply realized, and that something is actually being shared at the algorithmic level of description. It is a short step from here to functionalism and the vindication of the special character of psychology. An example that the reader may be familiar with of how this strategy pays off is the extraction of algebraic rules that represent relationships between placeholders (Marcus, 2001). But let me instead illustrate the point with a paradigmatic example, the approximation of Boolean functions for reasons that will become obvious in section IV, below. 
The acquisition of a Boolean function gets specified computationally as a truth table for all possible input-output pairings. This remains fixed. We can then discuss how a system does approximate the function; namely, whether the job gets done symbolically, via inferential processing sub-routings at the subpersonal level, as opposed to subsymbolically, via the local adjustment of connection weights. One way or the other, we know what we are after. The problem, however, with this rendering of the situation is twofold. On the one hand, (i) we do not really know what we mean when we say that the function has been approximated. On the other hand, (ii) we do not really know what we mean when we say that the function has been approximated. Since, as I have just said, the problem is that the computational level remains fixed, the reader can see that (ii) is what’s really at stake. But let me in this section pave the way for (ii) by saying something very briefly about problem (i) first.
As to the issue of when a computational function has been successfully approximated, we may ask somewhat more technically how we decide when a network has mastered a given task. Notice that were we to use for instance the root mean square (rms) error, we could not say that the network has learned the mapping when the error is zero. There will always be a residual error since the sigmoid activation function never reaches 0 or 1. One solution widely employed (Plunkett and Elman, 1997) is to round off the output activation values in such a way that if the target is 1, then activations close to 1 are taken to be correct, and the same goes for 0 as target and activations close to 0.
This is a minor problem by itself. But my worry is not that rounding off can be an arbitrary criterion of correctness. We can live with that. The problem is rather that using a target of 0/1 is done from a disembodied computational perspective. As a result, by rounding off we fail to realize that nothing is actually being shared when we reach the decision that two networks have mastered the task. From an embodied perspective, however, things look very different. Let us then turn to our second problem. Namely, what do we mean when we say that the function has been approximated? An example of embodied XOR morphological computation will show us why this represents a threat for the autonomy of psychology.

IV.	Individuating the vehicles of content in embodied cognitive systems 
Paul (2004) explores the potential of morphological computations; computations where the mechanical structure of the body itself plays a crucial role. A nice illustration is the morphology-based approximation of the Boolean function XOR. Paul (2004) designed a robot that courtesy of its morphology could exhibit some form of XOR-constrained behaviour.

[Insert figures 1 and 2 about here]

The robot is controlled by two perceptrons, one for a motor M1 that computes OR (figure 2), the other for a second motor M2 that computes AND. Whereas M1 turns an existing single wheel permitting forward motion, M2 serves to lift the wheel off the ground. By means of these two simple perceptron-governed patterns of behaviour, the robot is able to perform the XOR function (fig. 1).​[4]​ The structure of the robot permits the approximation of the NOT function which, when followed by the AND and OR functions, becomes computationally equivalent to the standard resolution of the XOR problem with a three-layer feedforward network. The difference here is that it is the body, and not another layer of connectionist processing, what delivers the goods. As Paul (2004) is quick to point out, the body is not merely an effector but part of the “cognitive” equation itself.
Morphological computations constitute a case of embodiment. However, disembodiment versus embodiment does not match straightforwardly onto the functionalist/reductionist dichotomy. Andy Clark, to name a well-known advocate of embodiment, is at the same time a functionalist. According to him, morphological computationalism is a clear example of “extended functionalism”. In short, cognition being embodied is compatible with a defence of multiple realizability. We may have different extended ways of approximating the same function. In the case of morphological computations, you may think of different ways in which the body itself can help out the perceptrons, computationally speaking. 
This rendering of the situation however lays the stress upon the different ways in which an algorithm can be implemented. And by focusing upon the implementational and algorithmic levels of description, we are turning a blind eye to problem (ii), as stated in section III, above. That is, we maintain unaltered the function to be approximated at the computational level of description. My point is that by reading Paul’s example instead as a case of radical (non-functionalist) embodiment, things look rather different:

According to radical embodiment, corporal details, generally speaking, say the unique morphological features that the XOR robot exemplifies, are an essential part of the equation.​[5]​ Computing XOR morphologically is not the same thing as modelling the approximation of the XOR function with a disembodied network. In real world navigation, embodiment and details of physical interaction do matter. In fact, to see how dramatically details external to the cognitive system itself can affect the overall result, consider the environment as well as an extension of the system and place the XOR robot downhill. The function, as described at the computational level, is altered and changes as a whole (Paul, 2004). The disembodied perspective focuses upon the inner workings of the network, ignoring body and environmental constraints. However, once these are acknowledged, the cognitive function, as computationally described, changes. Like the body, the environment is part and parcel of cognition, and having changed the computational function itself, failure to account for generalizations is assured unless morphology is considered as well. 
But what is the relation between morphological computation and the dismissal of functionalism? Notice that morphological computation still is compatible with the aforementioned rounding-off procedure. In most cases, constraints from embodiment are such that, from the higher level point of view, the error does not make a difference in terms of the overall behavioural output (say, “stationary” v. “moving” in figure 1). Or take for instance the pocketing of a ball in a game of pool. Say that you pocket it twice, first by striking the cue ball with a nice solid hit, and second somewhat more loosely. Insofar as the two sequences end up with the pocketing of the ball, the function can be said to have been approximated. But that is precisely what pumps the illusion that something is being shared. The price we pay is a failure to realize that the extended cognitive function itself may in fact have changed. Disembodiment places all function pairings on a par and does not allow us to see that. 
We fail to see that morphological computationalism is a case of radical and not extended, functionalism, because we only care to dig in when things fail to work. We are happy with the cognitive level description when things work, say, when the two balls get sunk in the pocket. But this is equivalent to the rounding-off method used in evaluating the network’s performance. The ball is in the pocket, flukes aside! But when things go wrong we need to dig in in order to understand what has happened.​[6]​ When things work we assume something is being shared. It is only when predictions fail that we need to understand the system as a whole. In fact, a disembodied prediction of what the XOR robot will do drives us to say that the robot is in error if for example it moves forward and downwards when the actuators are off, but once we honour a morphological computational level of description the former goal misrepresents the situation. It shows that nothing is being shared after all. If embodiment, writ large, matters non-trivially, many environmental and corporal changes (say, placing the robot downhill) will affect the function that describes the embodied cognitive system as a whole. 
Someone may argue that psychology is not doomed by the very fact of encountering exceptions in terms of the generalizations it delivers since those exceptions can get cashed out as we move downwards. Where exceptions do not occur, autonomy is preserved, the idea would be. The problem is to think that we need to account for similarities, but the enlarged embodied picture tells us that we do not need to do so. Once morphological computation is interpreted radically, psychology is not special anymore. Details of body implementation and environmental coupling not only matter, but are what ultimately explain the behaviour of the system. 
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^1	  The upshot of Laakso and Cottrell’s neurosimulation is that different dimensionality, architecture or encoding bring no trouble, insofar as correlated distances between points in the respective spaces are preserved. Churchland (1998) has further exploited Laakso and Cottrell’s measure in his defence of state space semantics, although see Calvo Garzón (2000) for problems with Churchland’s conception. Also, the fact that statistical analyses can highlight higher-level commonalities may be called into question, at least in the case of simple recurrent networks (Calvo Garzón, 2003), but I shall ignore these matters for present concerns.
^2	  I am assuming a connectionist architecture for the sake of argumentation, granting that it is an open empirical question what the correct architecture of cognition happens to be. Also, for purposes of illustration, I shall concentrate upon psychology as a special autonomous science. The bearing of the line of argument to be developed in due course may nonetheless be more far-reaching, once the alleged special character of other higher-level disciplines is considered.
^3	  Lack of causal efficacy is precisely what has driven O’Brian and Opie (2006) to reject clusters as types in favour of the local weight matrices that modulate the activity of each particular unit, what they dub fan-ins.
^4	  Notice that being perceptrons unable to compute the XOR function, the robot, by means of its own structural features, is what gets exploited computationally in a non trivial way.
^5	  Noë (2004) and Shapiro (2004) perfectly serve to illustrate this position in the philosophical literature. For an overview of embodiment in the scientific literature, see Calvo and Gomila (forthcoming). 
^6	  The reader may put it in terms of mechanisms (Bechtel and Richardson, 1993). If we have a cognitive level function to be matched algorithmically, thinking of networks that implement the function better or worse would be equivalent to having a mechanistic explanation where, once the components of the mechanism are identified in relation to the phenomenon in need of explanation, we ignore different tokenings of the phenomenon, and hold that the very same components and their spatiotemporal organization are preserved, come what may.
